



What Makes a Person?

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Is each human being born a person? If so, are we both born a person and a person in the making? Can a person be unmade?

This issue starts with Anthony Freeman's article on consciousness. After giving a brief history, he looks at the fascinating theory of emergent properties. He considers first the human mind as an emergent property: 'not an added ingredient to the physical body, but neither is it present in any individual brain cell.' He then goes on to apply this theory to the old formula of Christ as one person, both human and divine. So 'just as Christ's human mind – and indeed any human mind – arose from the complex physiology of his body, especially his brain and nervous system, so his divinity arose from the complex system which was his total humanity... The divine element in Christ is now to be understood as an emergent property.'

In *The Fall of Hyperion* Keats describes the emergence of 'God-consciousness' as a struggle that almost kills him, as *the poetic struggle*: 'Whereon there grew / a power within me of enormous ken / to see as a god sees.' And Christ is also called 'Incarnate Word'.

'God-consciousness' is a property that can emerge in human beings. This bold and brilliant suggestion is a fruitful approach to SoF's mission to explore gods and religions as human creations. And in this 'evolutionary' model humans are not split from the natural world. The human mind 'emerges' from living matter and 'God consciousness' from the human mind.

In the second article, Patti Whaley, former Deputy Secretary General of Amnesty International, explores what it means to say 'persons have rights.' She begins with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' call for the 'recognition of the inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family'. She looks at dignity as something each person is born with (we could call it 'ontological' dignity) and dignity as requiring 'the full and free development of our personality', something to struggle for (which we could call 'developmental'). For example, on their great march from the Lacandon Jungle in South-East Mexico to Mexico City in 2001, I saw young Zapatistas – mainly Mayan Indians – wearing paper headbands demanding PEACE WITH DIGNITY.

Whaley says this idea of human dignity has been criticised as 'ineliminably religious', because it implies a 'worshipful attitude' towards the human person. But, it could be answered, if we value human life, why should we not 'reverence' it? Another point Whaley stresses is that the human person exists *in community with others*. She says, 'The UDHR has often been accused of being hyper-individualistic, of privileging the demands of the individual over the needs of the community,' and calls this 'a very Western and very male view of the self'. But she suggests 'this might not be the whole picture' if we look more carefully at the Declaration. 'The community is actually the only medium in which the free and full development of [your] personality can take place.' David Paterson has provided a note on *Eastern Ideas of Self*, which differ from the Western viewpoint.

David Bryant's article on 'Depersonalisation' picks up on the double aspect of human dignity as something each person is born with and something requiring 'full and free development' and looks at how people can be 'depersonalised' by the way they are treated.

Inspired by Anthony Freeman's article, I looked again at the definition of Christ's person at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. I began listening to the Chalcedon statement as a kind of poem and made my version of a standard translation of it. On page 23 I have set out my English version side by side with the Latin. This statement stresses again and again that Christ, despite having both a human and a divine 'nature', is *the same* person. Listening to it aloud, you can't fail to hear the thunderous repetition of 'the same', 'the same', 'the same' ('*eundem*' in the Latin, '*ton auton*' in the Greek).

'What the thunder said' to me was two things. Firstly, about the self. I have always been puzzled at the postmodernist idea that we do not have a self or identity but are many selves, many identities. This is not my experience at all. I have felt myself to be myself as far back as I can remember. As John Gamlin said in *sof* 71 (about another postmodernist doctrine), it is 'for most



Motion for SoF AGM 2005: To modify the name of the magazine from *sof* to *sofia*

The main reason for modifying the name of the magazine from *sof* to *sofia* is that 'Sea of Faith' (or *sof*, its acronym) as a magazine title does **not** convey the idea that religion is not supernatural, but sounds like its opposite, supernatural and preachy. In the Matthew Arnold poem quoted in the first part of Don Cupitt's TV series, the term 'sea of faith' refers to the receding tide of *supernatural* faith. There are many people in Britain who agree with SoF's position that gods and religions are human creations, on the one hand (anti-fundamentalist), and that religions are an important part of the human treasury of imagination and wisdom, on the other (anti-restrictive rationalist). Many sympathisers with SoF's non-supernaturalist position (20 years after a TV series, which they may not have seen) have their first contact with the Network through the magazine.

Frequently the title 'Sea of Faith' either embarrasses or puts people off, even the well-disposed. Possibly for this reason, the magazine name was changed from 'Sea of Faith' to the initials *sof* at the May 2000 issue (41). But the title *sof* does not mean much to people, maybe just mystifies them, and any explanation refers back to 'Sea of Faith', so the same problem recurs. The title *sofia*, the Greek word for 'wisdom', is more recognisable, communicates better what the magazine is about and does not have the same supernaturalist stamp. It also has the advantage that our *sof* logo can remain, with just the letters 'ia' added on the end, so that the magazine maintains a distinct, but not separate, identity. See artwork for the proposed new magazine title above.

In column 1 of the magazine's inside front cover, under the title, it would read: '*sofia* is the magazine of the Sea of Faith Network (UK) ...' and continue as before unchanged. The editorial would make clear that the magazine's aim is to seek rather than dispense wisdom!

The Steering Committee has consulted at length with fellow-*sofers* in Australia, whose network is called SoFiA (Sea of Faith in Australia), and they have replied that they are content to leave the decision about the title of our magazine up to us. The Steering Committee decided that this was a decision for the Network Membership to take at the AGM.

people a non-issue, a fascinating point of philosophical debate perhaps, but playing no part in their daily lives.'

In the Chalcedon statement, Christ is one person in two natures. Perhaps one of the most common human experiences which feels like having 'two natures' is that of being a mother and also trying to do other work, such as writing perhaps. Apart from the logistics of child-minding, it requires a total 'gear-shift' from one to the other. But through all of that I never felt I was 'two selves'. I always felt I was the *same* person. Both 'ontologically' and (although life was often hard work) 'developmentally': this was also something I wanted to be, something to develop, integrity. I wanted to bring what I was thinking and writing to looking after my children, and my experience of them to my thinking and writing (though not necessarily by writing *about* them). I listened to the mantra of Chalcedon: *ton auton, ton auton, ton auton, eundem, eundem, eundem*, the same, the same, the same.

Moreover, it is not just the mother who is one person but also her child. In the Chalcedon statement Mary is called *theotokos*: 'god-bearer', 'mother of God', because you are not the mother of a 'nature' but of a person.

The second thing 'the thunder said' to me was a 'sofish' thing. Although the old Church fathers who wrote the Chalcedon statement believed that God, including God the Son, existed 'before the ages' – eternally and independently of us – nevertheless that thunderous repetition conveys very powerfully that God and human are the same, the same, the same. Christ, who is both God and human, *is the same person*.

Finally, at the AGM, the Network will be asked to decide about the name of your magazine. In the column to the left I repeat some of the arguments for modifying the name to *sofia*, which you should have already received with the June *Portholes*. As one member of the Steering Committee said, '*sofia* makes a lot of sense and has a lot going for it'. It will mean a change of two letters, the addition of 'ia'.

This reminded me that in the Chalcedon statement we also find, after a long and fierce dispute, the word '*homoousios*': 'consubstantial': that Christ was of 'the same substance' as the Father, the term favoured by Athanasius. The Arians thought he was 'of like substance' (i.e. similar but not the same), in Greek, *homoiousios*: the difference of just one 'i'. Gibbon famously sneered that the whole of Europe was fighting savagely over just one 'i'. At one point Athanasius had been so threatened that he had to escape at night by boat. Of course passions run high, but your editor, who is coming to the Conference and AGM, sincerely hopes she will not have to escape at night by boat (or minicab)!

Bless My Soul!

Anthony Freeman takes a fresh look at human and divine personhood.

All of a sudden the soul is back in fashion. Thirty years ago it had been so banished from polite society that even Bible translators tried to avoid using it. Now it has bounced back with such vigour that the *Times* newspaper no less has a weekly supplement titled 'Body and Soul'.

Should SoF members welcome this development? Will it help our efforts to explore and promote religious faith as a human creation? The answer is No if it signals a return to the discredited model of the human person as a 'ghost in the machine', or if it reflects intellectually sloppy New Age superstition. Both these dangers need guarding against. But explored against the best current research into human consciousness, the rehabilitation of the soul offers an opportunity to revisit some old theological language that could yield useful new insights into the nature of personhood.

The person (or mind or soul) is not an added ingredient to the physical body, but neither is it present in any individual brain cell. Like the liquidity of water, it is an emergent property.

A Brief History of the Soul

The ancient Hebrew understanding of a human being focused on what we think of as the body: a living person was a live body, animated by an impersonal 'breath of life', and a dead person was a dead body, lacking the breath of life. I say 'what we think of as the body' because there is no word in Hebrew for 'body' in contrast to 'mind' or 'soul', in the modern sense. Instead there are different words signifying the whole human person under different aspects, such as vitality or mortality. It is a holistic view.

This is in stark contrast to the dualist teaching of the ancient Greek philosopher Plato. For him the non-physical soul constituted the essence of a human being: a living person was an embodied soul, and a dead person was a disembodied soul; the physical body was just a temporary lodging.

These two approaches are sometimes referred to simply as Hebrew and Greek, but that is to oversimplify. Another influential Greek, Plato's pupil Aristotle, used the word 'soul' to denote the functional structure or 'form' of living things. On this understanding, the soul related to the organization and function of the physical body; it was not composed of matter, but it could not exist independently of matter.

Christianity is heir to the approaches of the Hebrew Bible, of Plato, and of Aristotle, but its most formative period – the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. – saw Plato's influence in the ascendant. So the classic Christian debates concerning humankind and God, which focused on the person of Jesus Christ, were conducted on the assumption that the essential person is a non-material soul temporarily inhabiting a physical body. This posed a problem for early theologians trying to understand the relation between the human and the divine in Jesus. Was his physical body inhabited and directed by both a human soul and the divine Word of God? And if so, how could he be a single fully integrated person? But if not, how could he be both fully human and fully divine?

The failure to answer these questions satisfactorily led to divisions in the Church that exist to this day, but one formula was accepted by the great majority. This proposed that Jesus (1) had a rational soul associated in the usual way with his body making him one human, and (2) had the Word of God associated in a precisely equivalent way with his total humanity (soul and body) making him one Christ. We shall return to this formula below.

Meanwhile St Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century set himself the task of reconciling this Platonic Christian teaching with the then newly-rediscovered philosophy of Aristotle. By now the claim that the human soul was immortal and lived on after the death of the body had long been official Church teaching, despite its apparent conflict with the Bible, which with its Hebrew pedigree spoke of the afterlife as the holistic resurrection of the body, rather than the dualistic immortality of the soul. Aquinas brought together in one system the contradictory views presented by Plato, Aristotle, and the Bible, and the synthesis he achieved forms the backdrop to all modern study of consciousness and personhood.

St Thomas kept to Aristotle's definition of the soul as the 'form' of a living organism, apart from which it was unable to exist. He taught that when a plant or animal died and ceased to exist physically, its soul also ceased to exist. But humans were different, because their souls –

uniquely among all creatures – were rational, which meant they engaged in thinking. Aquinas noted that intellectual activity was unlike anything that plants or animals did, because it was not in itself a bodily process. Anything done by a plant – taking up water, growing, wilting, producing flowers, etc. – was a process bringing about a change in the plant's physical state. In the same way, anything done by an animal – feeding, moving, fighting, breeding, etc – involved a change in the animal's body. So it followed that the governing principle of both plants and animals, their soul, had no role apart from the physical organism with which it was associated. But humans were different. They could think. And so far as Aquinas could tell, thinking – that is, things like imagining, deciding, planning, etc. – involved no necessary bodily process or change. So unlike the situation with plants and animals, in humans the governing principle – the rational soul – did have a role over and above that of directing the body and its organic processes. This gave Aquinas the opening he needed. If the rational soul could do things that did not directly bring about changes in the body, then it was not entirely nonsensical (as it would have been in the case of plants and animals) to think of that soul as continuing in existence even after the body had died and been destroyed.

But this raised a problem. According to Aquinas's way of thinking, a soul that was produced naturally along with its body (like those of plants and animals) would also be subject to the natural process of death and decay. So if the human soul really could survive bodily death, then God must have directly created it outside the natural course of events. The problem was that now this rational soul was being thought of in Aristotle's way (rather than as a Platonist's free-floating spirit), it was not clear how it could exist in isolation from the body.

The brilliant Aquinas turned this difficulty into an opportunity that enabled him both to reconcile Aristotle with the Church's official teaching and also to resolve a tension in Christian teaching between the bodily resurrection found in the Bible and the immortality of the soul inherited from Plato. The rational soul, said St Thomas, must be able to maintain some kind of existence without a body, but it would be a very unsatisfactory state for it to be in. It would not be able to do anything except think, because it still needed a body in order to receive information through the senses, to express itself, to act, to communicate with others, and so on and so forth. What the rational soul needed, in short, was to be reunited with its body after death in order to restore the whole person. Here, then, was the explanation, lacking in the Platonist version of Christianity, for the resurrection of the body. It would be the occasion for the restoration of the full person by the reuniting of the body and soul of those who had died.

Brilliant as Aquinas's synthesis was, it did not satisfy everyone. René Descartes in the seventeenth century declared it had been a mistake to suppose the rational soul (i.e., the thinking mind) and the physical body were



Michelangelo: Emergent Human Shape

bound together by some kind of necessity. If the rational soul could really function – even temporarily and unsatisfactorily – when it was cut off from the bodily senses, then however close the working relationship between them, body and soul must each exist quite independently of the other. In particular, it was the mind and not the body that constituted the person, the human subject, the 'I' of whom Descartes famously said, 'I think, therefore I am.' This declaration marked the watershed between the later Middle Ages and the Enlightenment. Quite simply Descartes dispensed with the more holistic approaches of the Bible and Aristotle and returned to a mind-body dualism much more like that of Plato and the fifth-century Church.

The Soul Today

Descartes' dualist view was dominant for the next 300 years, and could still be named by Oxford philosopher Gilbert Ryle in the middle of the twentieth century as 'the official doctrine' of philosophy of mind. But that was all about to change. Ryle himself led the assault on 'the dogma of the ghost in the machine', as he dubbed it: 'It is,' he wrote, 'entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of mistakes. It is one big mistake.'

In its place, there were proposed various theories affirming the essential unity of physical and mental aspects of a person. These approaches are called

physicalist (or materialist) because they give priority to a person's body, and claim that all mental states (thinking, believing, deciding, etc.) can be given a physical explanation. Some versions of materialism simply equate the mental and physical aspects of a person; others say that although the mind derives from the body, and is ultimately dependent on it, the mind cannot be identified 'without remainder' with the body alone – there is more to it than that.

The divine element in Christ is now to be understood as an emergent property.

I am going to consider just the second of these approaches, and in particular the theory known as emergence. Emergence – broadly defined – says that when physical entities reach a certain level of organisational complexity, there emerge genuinely new properties such that the whole is more than the sum of its parts. It appeals to many studying the nature of personhood, because it offers a bridge between those for whom everything is ultimately physical and those for whom there is an irreducible mental or spiritual component of reality that is essentially non-physical.

The paradigm example of emergence is the liquidity of water. A single H₂O molecule cannot be described as liquid or as wet; the water I drink from a glass is both wet and liquid, yet consists of nothing but H₂O molecules. Liquidity and wetness are not added ingredients to water, they are 'emergent properties' of it. For American philosopher John Searle, the conscious mind of a person is best understood in a comparable way as a causally emergent feature of the brain. The person (or mind or soul) is not an added ingredient to the physical body, but neither is it present in any individual brain cell. Like the liquidity of water, it is an emergent property.

On this understanding, the conscious mind has its origins in the physical brain, but is not simply the same thing as the brain. Having emerged from the physical body, but without any added ingredients, it exhibits new features over and above the sum of its parts. It takes on an existence of its own, which is more than just the subjective experience of the person concerned, and it has a legitimate place in the external world of bodies and events. But it cannot be altogether divorced from its physical basis.

Human and Divine Personhood

Now what happens when we apply this model of human being to the formula from the early Church concerning the person of Christ? The first part said that Jesus had a rational soul associated in the usual way

with his body making him one human. The formula's authors assumed that Jesus' human soul was a non-physical entity existing independently of his body, but we are assuming – on the emergence model – that his human mind (soul, person) arose from the complex physiology of his body, especially his brain and nervous system. So far so good. What about the second part of the old formula? That said that in the person of Christ, the Word of God was associated with Jesus' total humanity (soul and body) in a precisely equivalent way to that in which his human soul was associated with his body. Applied to our new understanding of human nature, this means the divine element in Christ is now to be understood as an emergent property.

That is to say: just as Christ's human mind – and indeed any human mind – arose from the complex physiology of his body, especially his brain and nervous system, so his divinity arose from the complex system which was his total humanity – body, mind, soul, consciousness. In other words: just as the mind or soul is not an added ingredient to the human body, but an integral emergent property of it, so Christ's divinity is not an added ingredient to his human person, but an integral emergent property of it. And the Christian tradition says that what is true of Christ's divinity is true of God absolutely.

John Searle uses the formula 'caused by and realised in' to explain the relation between an emergent property of a system and the lower-level elements that make up the system. Liquidity is a higher-level property caused by and realised in H₂O molecules; human consciousness – human personhood – is a higher-level property caused by and realised in the physical structure of the brain and nervous system. By extension I am suggesting that 'God-consciousness' – divine personhood – is a higher-level property still, caused by and realised in the physical-and-mental-totality of human beings.

For more background and discussion of the ideas contained in this article, see:

The Emergence of Consciousness, edited by Anthony Freeman (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2001).

Consciousness: A Guide to the Debates, by Anthony Freeman (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003).

Anthony Freeman is a priest in the Church of England. He has been managing editor of the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* since 1994.

People, Not Things

Patti Whaley, former Deputy Secretary General of Amnesty International, discusses human rights and the idea of the person.

Primo Levi, in *If This is a Man*, offered several reasons for his survival of Auschwitz. Finally he said, 'I was...helped by the determination, which I stubbornly preserved, to recognise always, even in the darkest days, in my companions and in myself, people, not things, and thus to avoid that total humiliation and demoralisation which led so many to spiritual shipwreck.'

Levi had, perhaps, never heard of the concept of human rights when he went to Auschwitz; but his determination to regard others as 'people, not things' sums up what the human rights movement is about. To write about the idea of the person in human rights is to try to tease apart two notions that are so intertwined, so mutually dependent, that it takes a while to see that there is something that could be called 'the idea of the person' in human rights at all. As Mary Midgley warned, in *The Myths we Live By*, the more fundamental a myth is, the more difficult it is to see it clearly.

On the one hand, we are born with dignity; on the other hand, our dignity depends on the full and free development of our personality.

Basically, it's this simple: persons have rights. To be a person is to have rights, and to claim rights is to claim full status as a person. At various times, and even now in many places, personhood has been denied to slaves; women; children; Jews; criminals; homosexuals; gypsies; indigenous people; people with disabilities; or any number of other alien or disenfranchised groups, and the denial of their personhood has been the excuse for the violation of their human rights. The history of the human rights movement could be described as the expansion of the idea of the person from those original bearers of rights – propertied, free, Christian white men – to successive groups of non-persons. Even now, for those of us who think we've fully bought in to the human rights approach to life, the discussion isn't over; most of us don't recognise embryos as persons, and as science draws closer to offering us clones,

robots, and other forms of modified and artificial life, the question of personhood, and the rights that attend upon it, will continue to arise.

The question is an acute one because the link between human rights and the person is absolute: the option of extending only some rights to groups of 'not-quite-complete persons' is foreign to the human rights approach. Granted, some people's rights are restricted for their own protection or the protection of others; many people lack the capacity or the resources to exercise their rights to the full; and all of us are obliged to restrain the exercise of our rights so that we don't trample on the rights of others. But we don't become non-persons; our status as rights-holders remains intact, and the need to restrain one right does not become the excuse for violation of any others. The idea invoked to justify the holding of prisoners at Guantánamo Bay, that certain people by virtue of their suspected crimes have 'sacrificed' their claim to basic human rights, is anathema.

How did such a concept of the person arise? If we look closely at the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we can derive some idea of the characteristics of the rights-bearing person. Then if we look at the story of how the UDHR came to be, we can discern two possible origins of the type of person portrayed in that document.

The UDHR doesn't define what a person is; but several of its clauses give a clear indication of what a person is assumed to be. Francesca Klug (in *Values for a Godless Age: the story of the United Kingdom's new Bill of Rights*) outlines three key points:

First, the human person has *dignity*. The preamble of the UN Charter asserts the 'dignity and worth of the human person'. The UDHR takes up this thread; its preamble calls for the 'recognition of the inherent dignity ... of all members of the human family'. Article 1 goes on to say that 'all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward each other in a spirit of brotherhood.' Article 29 speaks of humans as having a personality whose 'free and full development' is an essential element of dignity.

So, on the one hand, we are born with dignity; on the other hand, our dignity depends on the full and free development of our personality. Dignity consists

in being free and autonomous, in having the capacity to reason, in having a conscience to determine right from wrong, and in cultivating proper brotherly relations towards other humans. From this description, Klug draws the conclusion that the concept of human dignity envisioned in the UDHR is more complex than the simple freedom or liberty invoked by the French and American revolutions.

Dignity requires more than the absence of constraint; it requires access to the means for a decent life, an environment of social justice, and the availability of real choices about personal development.

Secondly, the human person has *equality*. Although equality had been asserted in the past, for example in the English Magna Carta, in the American Declaration of Independence, and in the French 'liberty, equality, fraternity,' these declarations essentially meant 'equality for people like us'. 'People like us' was understood, tacitly or explicitly, to exclude women, children, slaves, Jews, non-Europeans, and various other classes of non-persons. To combat these underlying assumptions, the UDHR spelled out exactly what was meant: human persons had rights 'without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.' All persons have 'equal protection of the law' and are 'equal before the law'.

Thirdly, the human person exists *in community with others*. The UDHR has often been accused of being hyper-individualistic, of privileging the demands of the individual over the needs of the community, and of failing to take account of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the community. This hyper-individualistic, hyper-autonomous view of the human, claiming his rights over and against the community, has been criticised as being a very Western and very male view of the self. This may well reflect how rights language has been used, particularly in the West; but a return to the original language of the UDHR suggests that this might not be the whole picture. Article 29 states that 'everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.' Both clauses are important here. The relationship is not merely one of mutual advantage, where you uphold your duties to the community in return for their protection of your rights as an autonomous person. The community is actually the only medium 'in which the free and full development of [your] personality' can take place. Paradoxically, your full realisation as an individual human person depends on your interaction with your community – on balancing your autonomy and freedom with an



US concentration camp at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba

equal measure of participation and responsibility.

Michael Ignatieff (in *Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry*) takes the view that the key characteristic of the person described in the UDHR is agency: the freedom and ability to make real choices about the things that make life meaningful. Human rights violations, in this view, are those actions that unjustly restrict or punish the exercise

of that agency, and rights language ought not be extended beyond the need to protect individual agency. The emphasis on the quality of agency is explicitly a minimalist view of the person, intended to sidestep questions about dignity, equality, or the qualities inherent in the good life, which are seen as unhelpfully controversial. Focusing on the concept of agency, or active self-determination, gives us a basic standard of human decency while allowing different persons and different cultures to define their own concept of the good or dignified life.

A further quality often invoked with regard to the person in rights language is integrity, that is, wholeness or inviolability. A person has physical and mental boundaries that may not be breached without his or her consent. So, for example, when Amnesty International decided to expand from working on only civil and political rights to working on all rights, their intermediate stepping-stone was to focus on those rights whose denial violated 'the integrity of the person'. This suggests that certain violations such as torture, imprisonment, slavery and rape are more serious than the denial of the right to education or the right to vote; although these latter violations deny the full agency of the person, they do not violate his integrity.

Beyond these rather general qualities, the human rights paradigm doesn't develop the idea of the person in much detail. Obviously the rights ascribed to persons in the UDHR tell you things about what a person does: they need food and medical care, they have families, they work, they rest, they own property. But there is relatively little attention to the inner qualities of the person. We know from Article 1, cited above, that people have reason and conscience; beyond that, only Articles 18 and 19, which protect the freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and expression, suggest anything about the inner life of the person, and they do not delve further into what that inner life might be. The UDHR does not speculate on whether the person has a soul, or has any life beyond their time span on this earth; other than protecting our freedom of religion, the UDHR presents a wholly secularised view of the person. This might seem so obvious as not to bear pointing out; it becomes more important when we realise that some

rights statements developed in other cultures, for example in Islamic societies, grant rights to the dead.

We have then, in the UDHR, the idea of an autonomous person, with dignity, equality, agency, and integrity, developing within a community of other persons, and bounded by birth and death, beyond which no questions of rights arise. How did we arrive at such an idea of the person?

The human person exists in community with others.

One view – we could call it the ‘optimistic’ view – is that this is the way persons actually are. The idea of the inherent dignity of the person stretches back as far as Roman and classical law, and continues through writers such as Locke and Thomas Paine. For some philosophers dignity was simply ‘natural’, ‘self-evident’ or ‘inherent’; for others, dignity derived from God. The choice of the word ‘dignity’ in the UDHR was a way of accommodating both points of view; both religious and non-religious people could find common ground in the idea of dignity, and could hold their own opinions about the origins of that dignity. Nevertheless, Michael Perry has suggested that even this idea is ‘ineliminably religious’. That is, whether or not the idea of human dignity originates or can be located in any of the existing world religions, it has the quality of a religious idea. To imply that there are sacred limits which humans must not cross in their dealings with each other is to take a ‘worshipful attitude’ towards the human person.

The alternate view – let’s call it the ‘pessimistic’ view – is that the UDHR represents a reaction to the experience of World War II. After the Holocaust, and the realisation not only of the crimes committed by

the Nazis but also of the ability of ordinary citizens to stand by and see such crimes committed, people desperately needed some way of reassuring themselves that such crimes would never happen again. In creating the UDHR, they didn’t so much recognise human dignity as construct a barrier to guard against our natural indifference to the suffering of those outside our own circle. ‘In other words,’ explains Ignatieff, ‘we do not build foundations on human nature but on human history, on what we know is likely to happen when human beings do not have the protection of rights. We build on the testimony of fear, rather than on the expectations of hope.’ This is a much darker picture; it suggests that if there is such a thing as ‘human nature’, it’s not a pretty sight. By this view, the portrayal of the person in the UDHR is an attempt, whether consciously or unconsciously, to create something different from human nature: not what we are, but what we might hope to become if we continually hold the UDHR as our standard.

Which of these is the true view? On an optimistic day, I might say that wisdom lies in being able to keep both possibilities in mind; we have both innate dignity and innate depravity, and human rights is simply a vehicle by which we help ourselves to choose dignity. On the day that I write this, when the self-styled ‘civilised world’ is debating the publication of photos of a former dictator in his underwear, the pessimistic view wins out. That Saddam Hussein wears underwear, and looks as hapless in it as most of us do, is not news; that some of us are still prey to this mixture of petty vengeance and adolescent voyeurism – now, that’s scary.

Patti Whaley is a former Deputy Secretary General of Amnesty International and currently works with Forum for the Future. She is the current Treasurer of the Sea of Faith, and a trustee of the British Institute of Human Rights.

Patti Whaley recommends Michael Tippett’s *A Child of our Time*

The Prom Season opens on 13 July with Michael Tippett’s *A Child of our Time*. If you don’t already know Tippett, this is one of his most accessible works, one of the finest oratorios of the 20th century, and, sadly, a work of continuing political relevance. The immediate inspiration for *A Child of our Time* was the *Krystalnacht*; a young Jewish boy, desperate about his deported mother, shot a German official, and as punishment the Germans raided the Jewish quarter. Tippett, a devoted Jungian, interprets the boy and the Jews as the archetypal scapegoat, suggesting parallels with Jesus, the Hebrews in Egypt and the slaves in America. Arching above these references is a broader symbolism of winter and spring, death and rebirth, and our own

struggle with guilt and innocence. We all demonise The Other, says Tippett; and only when we recognize that we do, can we begin to stop.

Although the music is contemporary, the structure is pure Bach, with the chorus at the centre. As the rioting Germans, their music is fierce and angular; as the soul meditating on its own dark night, it is lyrical and spacious; as the congregation, they anchor the piece in gorgeous arrangements of Negro spirituals. You’ve probably heard these – they’re often performed separately; but how much more deeply they ring in context, as we encounter our own need to blame, to hate, and to be reborn.

Eastern Ideas of Self

A Note from David Paterson

'The Brahman and the Atman are one'

In Eastern thought, the clear distinction, coherence and uniqueness of a personality or 'self' for each human being is not taken as a starting point as it usually is in the West. Each 'self' is an aspect of the one 'Self'; or perhaps 'self/Self' is *maya* – an illusion.

I think this is a very different concept of selfhood, which shows up much of our Western obsession with selfhood as a wrong turn in human development – or at least a suspect one. Here are just four examples out of thousands that could be selected, both in the source materials and in the philosophical discussions which arose out of them:

'The individual self and the universal Self, living in the heart, like shade and light, though beyond enjoyment, enjoy the result of action. All say this, all who know Spirit, whether householder or ascetic'.¹

'He is below, above, behind, in front, on the right, on the left. He is everything. If I put I instead of He, I say, I am below, I am above, I am behind, I am in front, I am on the right, I am on the left. I am everything. I put Self instead of He, I say, the Self is below, above, behind, in front, to the right, to the left. The Self is everything. The personal Self is the impersonal Self. He who sees, thinks, knows this, loves the Self, plays with the Self, enjoys the Self, governs himself, moves himself everywhere at his pleasure. Those who think otherwise are governed by others. They lose what they gain. Nowhere can they move at their pleasure'.²

The man of Tao
remains unknown
perfect virtue
produces nothing
'No-Self'
is 'True-Self'.
and the greatest man
is Nobody.³

And a similar denial of self is a core belief of Buddhism:

'It is this notion of 'self' which causes people to experience life as sorrowful. It was from this condition, from these constraints, that Gotama sought some way of deliverance. The problems of human life with which the Buddha was primarily concerned were the kind of problems which arise with the development of individualism'.⁴

1. Purohit Swami and W.B. Yeats, *The Ten Principal Upanishads – Katha Upanishad*, I: 3, page 31.

2. *Op cit.*, *Chhandogya Upanishad*, VII: 24, page 106.

3. Thomas Merton, *The Way of Chuang Tzu*.

4. Trevor Ling, *The Buddha*, page 96.

I is an Other

'*Je est un autre*' – RIMBAUD

There are ways of trying,
though the I a friend had argued for
in casual debate is not enough.
'Be careful', I had said.
'You have to match the singular
to all that lies outside it,
gives it meaning, makes it work.
There are conditions that determine
what this I can say or do.
Poetry, it's true, begins from the self.
but can't assume that what it speaks for
comes from nothing else. Beyond it
lie the voices it subsumes,
the history it's rooted in.
Take Mandelstam,
speaking for the dispossessed.
He as you and we and us,
the I that isn't them, makes moves
against the enemy within.
You see how vulnerable
this floating I can be,
attempting its autonomy as if
it had the power to stand alone
against the forces of the universe.'

Christopher Hampton

Hard dark green binders for the magazine with SoF logo in gold on the spine are now available again. Each binder holds 12 magazines. £5.50 each including p&p or £25 for five including p&p. Cheques payable to Sea of Faith. Order from:

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All Saints Vicarage
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Gazeley
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CB8 8RB

The Demons of Depersonalisation

David Bryant looks at the way depersonalising and distancing ourselves from others enable us to kill, torture, abuse and discount them.

The authorities at my 1940's boarding school had a crude and blinkered vision. Their *raison d'être* was 'to make a man of you.' This involved a two-pronged destructuring process affecting body and mind. First came a physical toughening up engineered by a regime of bullying, corporal punishment, sexual abuse and social isolation. There followed a spiritual denuding in which aesthetic sensibilities were extinguished. My love of wild flowers, incompetence at games, appreciation of poetry, search for rare butterflies and times of silent reflection smacked of effeminacy or worse. They had to be eliminated.

The theory was that when fully de-personalised we could be rebuilt, refashioned into fearless, stiff-lipped rugby enthusiasts with a due respect for King, country and the established church. At that point we were ready to enter the paternalistic, male-orientated world outside. A few of the tough-minded fought back. Some succumbed.

Schoolboys of the 1940's aren't the only ones to have suffered a restructuring process. The same fate has befallen God. The urge to create super-gods with fire and bite has proved overwhelming throughout history. These man-made gods have been localised and turned into territorial despots. They have been painted as vengeful, possessive, all powerful and punitive, dishing out carrots in the shape of heaven and punishments via a roasting in hell.

In every war it is important – no, imperative – that the people believe the enemy is inhuman.

Harmless enough surely? After all, it's just playing theological word games. Unfortunately it doesn't stop at that. Hand in hand with our man-made gods comes the claim to exclusivism. 'The god I've knocked up at my work bench is superior to yours'. And that sets us all fair and square on the road to bigotry, arrogance, hatred and war. It reorientates our perception of those whose gods are other than our own, compelling us to view them with derogatory language as infidels, non-Christians, heretics, sinners, papists or atheists. The more we adapt our gods to our preferred image, the more entrenched and embattled we become. Nietzsche wasn't joking when he said, 'The Christian resolve to find the world ugly and bad has made the world ugly and bad.'

The sociological kickback from all this can be savage. Take the chilling photographs of Iraqis being tortured in Abu Ghraib prison, issued by *The Washington Post* on



US soldier with prisoner in Abu Ghraib, Iraq

June 11th 2004. The sheer brutality, violence, crudity and sadism are enough to shock one to the core.

No less chilling is the depersonalising language surrounding the event. One Pentagon official commented, 'We're not going to read more people than necessary into our heart of darkness. The rules are grab whom you must. Do what you want.' One soldier interviewed by *The New Yorker* had this to say, 'I questioned some of the things I saw, such as leaving inmates in their cell with no clothes or in female underpants, handcuffing them to the cell door. The answer I got was, "This is how military intelligence wants it done." A subordinate who complained of torturers sodomising prisoners with chemical lights and savaging them with military dogs was given the official reply, "Don't worry about it." This is sterile language, bleached of even a trace of humanity and if it doesn't raise more than a prickle of unease it should.

What of the alleged more than 100,000 civilian deaths in Iraq since the outbreak of war? One onlooker had this to say: 'In every war it is important – no, imperative – that the people believe that the enemy is inhuman. They are all monsters. Therefore we are all justified in making sushi out of their children. They started it. They are evil.' This 'dampening down' of humanity and the categorisation of torture, death and injury as 'collateral damage' are the *sine qua non* of war. Give people personality, a name, a shape and a reference point in society and bombing them becomes impossible. Killing or mangling somebody's daughter, mother, girlfriend or baby cuts too near the quick.

It isn't just these headline-grabbers that smack of depersonalisation. We see it all around us in society's nomenclature for minority groups. Refugees, alcoholics, teenage mothers, abortion-seekers, drug addicts and homosexuals are viewed as statistics not people, case studies not individuals. They are hounded by the press,

railed against by the church and belittled by society. It is a bleak and terrifying picture, an indication that our 'civilised' society is cracking at the seams.

Can we put into place any damage limitation? The answer is a guarded yes. Take our man-made gods with their moral absolutes, religious certainties and divisive imperatives. I believe that behind them all lies an all-embracing, burgeoning creativity, described in the Genesis creation story (1:3) as a benign *ruach* ('spirit', 'wind') brooding over the universe. Rudolf Otto in his *Idea of the Holy* referred to it as 'the numinous', 'the *mysterium tremendum*', before which we feel an instinctive sense of thrill and awe. But that is not all. The 'numinous' leads to the ethical. 'On the rational side of this non-rational element, (the numinous) are love, mercy, pity, comfort.'

But how do we go about restoring those who have been marginalised and maligned in society? We could start by turning to Martin Buber's enduring classic, *I and Thou*. His vision is both profound and compelling. For the most part, we observe other people keeping a part of ourselves withheld. We maintain a distance, a gulf, a coolness. The essence of this impersonal relationship is I-It. But it is possible to transform and enrich it so that we throw ourselves wholly into it, 'without masks, pretences, sometimes even without words.' The relationship has now burgeoned into one of deep respect and heightened perception. As Martin Buber puts it:

Love ranges in its effect through the whole world. If we take our stand on love and look with its eyes, we see people released from their entanglement in bustling activity. Good people, and evil, wise and foolish, beautiful and ugly, become successively real to us; that is, they are released to step forth in their particularity and meet us as Thou.

One Pentagon official commented, 'The rules are grab whom you must. Do what you want.'

But don't let's leave it at that. The vision is worthless without dynamic action. We need radically to shift our perception of the ostracised and marginalised in society and to view them as an invaluable and integral part of the sum of things. They too are entitled to their place in the quantum universe. And our military structures, welfare agencies and government departments have to be purged and stripped of anonymity, facelessness, the 'pigeon-hole' mentality and sheer indifference. Not only that. Our towns, villages and housing estates need to be re-personalised so that the demons of gang warfare, violent muggings, shop-lifting and anti-social behaviour are starved of the impersonality on which they feed.

We have to re-attune ourselves to the world so that we see its people in a transfigured light. The surly market stall-holder has a wife suffering from cancer. The checkout girl has just lost her mother. The elderly pensioner with baked beans in his trolley is dying of loneliness. The lad delivering newspapers has just experienced his first kiss.

In a re-personalised society such as this, the sick horrors of Abu Ghraib, the cold heart of organised religion and the slaughter of innocents in Iraq would be unthinkable.

David Bryant is a member of the Society of Friends and an occasional contributor to the *Guardian* 'Face to Faith' column.

The Anonymous Makers

Arrington, Cambridgeshire

Out of the nameless places of their birth,
under the tutelage of a classless sun,
these people have emerged in their millions.

Note them where they've left their mark,
where, everywhere at work, these hands
have coaxed the earth to fruitfulness.

The credit may have gone to others,
individuals abusing power

to build positions for themselves

and rise upon the backs of the anonymous.

But here you sense the presence in the fields
of what these nameless men and women did.

The air is vibrant with the record of it,
visible and interlinked. a wordless book

that leaves ambiguous proofs of the narrative -
an epic that reveals itself through every curve

and layer after layer of the yields of earth -
transformed, reformulated, sealed away.

Christopher Hampton

Grand Inquisitor Becomes Pope Benedict XVI

Brazilian writer and priest Frei Betto fears the consequences of Joseph Ratzinger's election to the papacy.

The election of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger as pope is a worrying sign that the direction of the Catholic Church is more confused and lost than we imagined. The opposite of fear is not courage, it is faith. Many cardinals appear to be more imbued with fear than with faith. To elect as pope a man responsible for the Church's orthodoxy, head of the ancient Holy Office, constitutes a gesture of retraction and defence before a world which is perturbed, which expects from Rome more than anathema, censure, mistrust and segregation.


Ratzinger was a moderate theologian, open to inter-religious dialogue and to modern science, to the contribution of Protestant theologians for a better understanding of the Bible, until he left Germany to take on, in Rome, the position of Grand Inquisitor. During the period in which he headed the Congregation for Doctrine of the Faith, he punished 140 Catholic theologians, among whom was Leonardo Boff. His obsession is Nietzsche, whose ghost he identifies in post-modern culture.

It seems like a joke to remember, today, that in the 19th century Pope Pius IX (1846-1878) condemned freedom of thought and of opinion, secular education, progress, and even electric light! For him, the modern world was created in the devil's workshop. Author of *Syllabus of Errors*, a catalogue of ecclesiastical anathemas, he was against the autonomous and lay state and in 1850 he prohibited the Jews in Rome from testifying against Christians in penal and civil trials, possessing property; having access to the public school and university (excepting medicine).

Pope Pius IX condemned freedom of thought and of opinion, secular education, progress, and even electric light!

I fear that a similar regression will occur in Ratzinger's pontificate. In his last sermon as cardinal, before the start of the conclave, he declared himself a candidate, making it very clear how he thinks: he accused Western culture of being relativistic, he condemned Marxism, liberalism, atheism, agnosticism and syncretism. He will not accept cultural and religious pluralism, diversity of cultures. He even dreams of a Church which is institutionally sovereign amongst peoples and governments, imposing on all its values and norms of behaviour. It is a return to Christendom, when the Church reigned in medieval times.

Before condemning the legitimate expressions of modern culture, Ratzinger should ask himself if the Church has not failed in the evangelisation of Europe, where



Frei Betto

churches seem more full of tourists than of the faithful. Why was the Church not in the forefront defending the victims of the Industrial Revolution as Marxism was? Are not atheism and agnosticism the fruit of our failure to witness to the gospel? And how can someone in the Vatican speak about syncretism, when in the Vatican's own rituals, protocol and etiquette which stem from the Roman Empire and from European nobility mingle together? 'Supreme Pontiff' is the pagan title adopted by Roman emperors.

The new pope will not accept cultural and religious pluralism, diversity of cultures. It is a return to Christendom.

I am not aware of whether the new pope has any social sensitivity. The image of the poor and the tragedy of poverty are not recurrent in his pronouncements and writings. But I pray that he will keep up the habit of meditating on the words and actions of Jesus of Nazareth, who preferred to love rather than condemn, defended the adulterous woman, did not preach a moralistic sermon to the Samaritan woman who was with her sixth man, cured the Phoenician woman and the Roman centurion's servant without demanding that they profess his faith, identified with the poorest (the hungry, the migrants, the sick and the oppressed), did not remain indifferent to the hungry crowd and taught that to govern is not to rule, but to serve.

What offers a thread of hope is the fact that Ratzinger adopted the name Benedict XVI. Usually this signals the interest of the new pontiff in following the work of his predecessor of the same name. Benedict XV, pope between 1914 and 1922, was an open man. He stopped the persecution of the 'modernists', valued ecumenism, promoted dialogue between Catholics and Anglicans, showed an interest in Eastern Churches and, above all, fought colonialism and struggled with impartiality for the ending of the First World War. We can only pray that the new pope will come down from his pedestal of theological academicism and become a pastor, embracing the most evangelical and forgotten papal title: 'Servant to the servants of God'.

Translated from the Portuguese by Helen Hughes.

Frei Betto is a Brazilian writer and priest. He is a special Assistant to President Lula and advises on the government's Zero Hunger Programme.

Please send your letters to:
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Contact *sof* Letters' Editor for details and booking for the SoF Annual Conference in Leicester, 26th- 28th July 2005.

Giles Hibbert (*Easter, the Feast of Liberation, sof 71*) makes the point that the Gospels were not written by newspaper reporters; if he had added that they were, in fact, written by people of faith, for the purpose of creating or strengthening faith in others, he would have strengthened his argument and would have made the futility of going to the Gospels with a 20th-21st Century question, which assumes that the Resurrection can be forced into the category of 'event', even clearer.

If our trying to understand the gospels is to have integrity, it is essential that we acknowledge the agenda of the Gospel writers. We do not have direct access to 'what happened'. We do not even have direct access to the words of Jesus. We have only, in the first instance, an assortment of manuscript copies of what the evangelists chose to put on paper. And what they put down was not the work of biographers, historians or journalists. It was something much closer to preaching: speaking (well, writing) to faith, out of faith.

As Hibbert well says, if we persist with the question 'what happened next?' where it is inappropriate, we end up with the bad theology of a 'conjuring trick' God. Asking this question of the Gospel records – a question which seems so necessary and so important to modern minds with a naive belief in 'facts' – not only leads to bad theology, it also does violence to the true nature of the records of faith left to us by the Gospel writers.

Donald Feist,
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 New Zealand
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Dinah Livingstone writes (*Editorial: Rise and Shine, sof 71*), 'We created God, projecting onto him our ideals of human possibility for love and justice.' And John Gamlin writes (*Energy, Life and Spirit, sof 71*), 'I am with Don Cupitt on the non-realist God ...'

Great, just what I expect to read in the magazine of a movement based on the premise that all religion is a human product. But between Livingstone and Gamlin comes Giles Hibbert (*Easter, the Feast of Liberation, sof 71*) with an article full of God-talk, hailing 'Christ the King': 'essentially the agent or deputy as it were, or representative of, the Lord Yahweh, the only true and ultimate king ...' Here is pure theism with Jesus linked to it in a role that the historical Jesus, the man of Nazareth, did not claim for himself and at which he

would have been appalled. In order to reach the conclusions about God and Jesus that he holds, Hibbert takes as authentic sayings of Jesus that historical-critical scholarship has shown to be the creation of the Gospel writers. See, for example, *The Five Gospels: The Search for the Authentic Words of Jesus* by Robert W. Funk, Roy W. Hoover, and the Jesus Seminar (Macmillan, 1993).

Please, no more theism and orthodox Christology in *sof*.

Hershey Julien
 Palo Alto, CA USA

Living here, in the midst of a Christian fundamentalist time warp, where belief in anything other than the King James Version is likely to have you burnt at the stake, one eagerly awaits the arrival of *sof* and the chance to immerse oneself in some much needed 'heresy'.

However for practical application, the use of the mainly 'heady' intellectual articles printed in the magazine, is often a non-starter in church services. Yes, there are some of us who still want to lead meaningful worship Sunday by Sunday; but from the perspective of our post-modern culture and the concept of religious faith as a human creation.

Hence my pleasure in finding William Imray's contribution on 'Open Liturgy' (*An Attempt to Produce an Open Liturgy, sof 71*). As a practising minister I find his attempt refreshing and illuminating. Yes, some of the language may be too intricate for parish worship, but he has amply demonstrated that a more modern and meaningful expression is possible, and, as he hints in his introduction, all are free to 'add refinements as they see fit'.

This is the sort of article I'd hope to see more frequently published as an aid and stimulus for those of us who have to struggle with bridging the enormous gap that has developed in worship services today. People still seek to celebrate life; let us all try to enable them in their ventures. How about a column on modern rites once in a while?

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William Imray's correct email address is:
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Mayday Notes

Words and Music

William Imray writes that he is pleased with the response to his *Attempt to Produce and Open Liturgy*, an extract from which appeared in *sof* 71. He has now sent out the complete text and music to three enquirers, including a member of the Steering Committee in SoF New Zealand, where they hope to perform the liturgy. This was despite the fact that his email address was printed incorrectly. Many apologies for this. His correct email address is biro33@aol.com

I have seen the beautiful hand-written music, but have not yet heard it as, he says, it needs a choir.

I was thinking about the fact that we may regard music as 'more spiritual' than words, whereas in some ways it is more physical. Singers must breathe well. I have watched my son playing the trumpet and at times go bright red in the face with effort. Imray himself is an organist, which is hard work. Secondly, music can move us more immediately than words. Indeed, sometimes when different words are set to the same tune, the words may act as a mental check on our ready emotions. For example, we might happily get carried away by the hymn 'Glorious things of thee are spoken...' but worried when the words turned out to be '*Deutschland, Deutschland über alles*'.

One way in which 'poetry aspires to the condition of music' is that in poetry the physicality of the words (the poem's rhythm, melody and shape) is very important, the spoken word. Hopkins calls poetry 'the darling child of speech and lips'. Of course, the spoken word has its own rhythms (and I am sure Imray, for one, could tell us about the many difficulties of setting words to music). And just as different creatures have their own basic rhythms, so do different spoken languages (for example, English is stress-timed, whereas French is syllable timed). Our first experience of rhythm is in the womb. As the foetal heartbeat is faster than the mother's, there are two different rhythms going at once, so even the unborn probably get an inkling of counterpoint rhythm!

Abelard's hymn *O quanta qualia* celebrates the joys of heaven:

*Nec ineffabiles
cessabunt jubili
quos decantabimus
et nos et angeli.*

There'll be no ending
the unutterable praises
that we and the angels
together shall sing.



The operative word is 'unutterable'.

Traditional angels are pure spirits; they have no bodies and are not in time. Therefore they cannot make or utter songs and poems like ours on Earth. It is our rhythmical mortal bodies that not only give our musical and poetic utterances power over fellow humans, but make music and poetry possible at all. See Anthony Freeman's article on page 5 for Aquinas on the problem facing the disembodied human.

On our Earth 'everything is rhythm'. I notice than in TV Wildlife programmes every single thing a bird or animal does is described as purely instrumental behaviour for survival. This is probably correct and of course it is hazardous to claim any knowledge of what it feels like to be a creature of another species. (Nevertheless, my cat...). However when a robin sings so deliciously, isn't it possible that it feels some kind of joy, as well as doing its biological duty to attract a mate? Perhaps we cannot know, but the robin's silvery song, the blackbird's more 'talkative' riffs and the cat's contented purring are not alien to us; wordlessly they communicate something about what it is all to be fellow creatures of the same Earth, related in evolutionary descent and part of one eco-system. Earth is our common matrix, from which human consciousness emerged, with our power to make poems and songs. Human music is earthly and we give Earth a human voice.

A poem is not *just* a physical utterance 'aspiring to the condition of music'. It is made of words and words *mean to say* things. (However, a poem will have resonances for readers beyond the writer's intentions, especially if it lasts for centuries.) I don't agree with the dictum that in poetry there should be 'no ideas but in things'. Although physicality, the appeal to the senses and images are very important, it is a dire restriction of poetry's scope to ban any abstract ideas. Its scope must be as broad as the human mind itself. Another dire restriction of poetry's scope is the postmodernist *Huis Clos* insisting that 'a poem is just a self-referential verbal artefact, completely focused on language,' in the jargon, just a 'text'. I think poetry, and human dignity itself, depend on glad recognition of our earthly home and kinship, together with our ongoing struggle ('intolerable wrestle') to understand and express this life truthfully, poetically, musically – body and word. Then act as wisely as we can.

Ken Smith reviews

Where We Are Now

Pamphlet by SoF North West England Group. £1.25

Life is partly about telling stories, and maybe trying to find one to live within. But as a former fundamentalist of a fairly rabid sort, I have a fair few irrational misgivings about Testimony telling. So I agreed with some reluctance to our editor's request for a short review of *Where We Are Now* – a booklet from the North West England SoF Group. Having read it several times now, I'm glad I agreed, because life is not only about telling stories; it's also about listening to others telling theirs. The booklet consists of 11 pieces of personal story-telling from one of our most lively local groups, with a strong emphasis on the interim nature of such story telling – i.e. true for me and true for me now.

At the end of a very funny Peter Cook and Dudley Moore dialogue about religion, the pair conclude that it would be better if no one had ever been told about God. Peter Cook confesses he's never told anyone about God, and Dudley Moore says: 'Neither have I, Pete!' Twenty five years down the line and after most of a life time trying to teach theology, I have to confess more than a little sympathy for the sentiment.

But people have been told about God. Lots of people remain happy with ideas associated with the word. By contrast the Sea of Faith exists and prospers partly because a lot of other people, having been told about God, are no longer happy with what has traditionally been said. As a bereavement counsellor I am interested in all kinds of loss and the way people deal with the ensuing grief. The loss of faith is one of the most profound. A number of the contributors to *Where We Are Now* honestly refer to this sense of loss, looking back with a certain wistfulness, finding it hard to let go. One could almost say that it is a theme that runs through the booklet. Truthfully, it is actually quite hard to give up the idea that one is going to live for ever, or that there is something eternal about the significance of our small lives. Which brings me back to Dud and Pete. Given that theological reflection is a minority sport, are we the worse for having been told about God – or specifically, for most SoF members, the monotheistic western god? And given the traditional division between those who do and those who don't believe, where do 'those who don't' go from here so that what we engage with, in both thinking and living, gets bigger and the self that is the engager gets smaller?

So, buy it, read it and write your own.

Where We Are Now is available from Andy Kemp, 12 Sandringham Avenue, Hoylake, Wirral CH47 3BZ. Price £1.25 -cheques made out to 'Sea of Faith North West England Group'.

Ken Smith is a member of SoF Steering Committee and editor of *Portholes*.

Rachel

The gene pool made her
The family environed her
And the past history of humanity taught her,
So she became what she is,
Unique. Rachel.

Her twin shared her beginnings with her
Their skin and their scent,
But each one is different in manners and humour
No one is ever identical replica,
Individual. Rachel.

They call it the chaos theory
Or the effect of the butterfly,
It is that inexplicable variation of life
Which makes each of us, us,
Special. Rachel.

There's no God
No magical parent controlling.
From the moment of birth we're alone
Inside our own skins.
She's alone.
So alone. Rachel.

The cancer attacked and betrayed her
She who loved walking and climbing and talking
She who ran marathons, studied psychology,
Lived life to the full for the love of it
So brave, my daughter,
My Rachel.

Joanna Clark

Joanna Clark is a long-term member of SoF and convenor of the Dorset Group.

Dominic Kirkham reviews

The Way to Happiness

by Don Cupitt

Polebridge Press. 2005. 85pages. £10. ISBN 0-944344-53-4

Happiness is everywhere – or at least Happiness Studies concerned with its absence. From the exhibition at the Baltic Exchange ('Every Minute You are Angry you Lose Sixty Seconds of Happiness') to brain science (which suggests it could all be just a neurological 'tic') to 'Mindfulness' techniques – the new craze sweeping America aimed at banishing the stresses of daily life. The 'happiness agenda' is seeking to find out what's going on.

Don Cupitt weighs in with this crisp little book of seventy-seven pages, written with all his customary verve (but printed in very small type). I enjoyed many of his 'riffs', as the non-schematic sections into which the book is divided are called: for example, his discussion of the power of language to shape both our sense of self and cultural world; of the revaluation of secular life through which we have come to see that the world is 'outsideless'; of the difference between *allocentric* love (focused possessively on an other) and the *agapeistic* or boundless love of life which just *is* God. These themes, and others, echo previous writings, particularly *Solar Ethics*, but what exactly they have to do with happiness I am not quite sure.

Perhaps it was because of this that I must confess to a certain disappointment with the book. Or perhaps it was because I was expecting something different. The title and cover to the book, emblazoned as it is with a large Chinese ideogram (which I assume to be a Taoist symbol – that also reappears between the 'riffs') gave a hint of oriental enlightenment that never materialised. Perhaps I was expecting something on the lines of the Dalai Lama's *The Art of Happiness*, with its sage advice for daily living. But this was not the book.

Instead, we have what aspires to be the spiritual equivalent of 'A Fanfare for the Common Man'. Don has recently discovered the significance of 'ordinariness' – though by a very tortuous route – and is now 'looking for a theory of religion that might be personally helpful to modern Westerners who are temperamentally highly religious, and who want there to be religion, but who know that virtually all received religious ideas, doctrines, and institutions are obsolete.' Phew! Sounds serious, and it is. Where traditional religion once offered the promise of eternal happiness, we are invited to see religion as the symbolic language with which we 'can voice our joy in and love for the world, life and each other'. True religion is now 'cosmic emotion'; meta-spirituality just the ticket to offset the whirl of hyper-materialism.

There is no lack of ambition here. Don wishes to write 'the first really truthful religious book', which recognises that what the 'Abrahamic' traditions call the



Kingdom of God on earth – the coming together of the sacred and profane at the end of history, the end of religion – is, we are told, now happening in our secularised culture. Though such a book would mark the end of religion as a distinct institution, and as such be 'the last religious book', this one is a continuation of previous work, such as *The New Religion of Life*, which explored how popular idioms revealed 'life' had replaced 'God' as the new religious object of embraveive meaning. Ordinary language has become radical theology, and this book is interested in making sense of the spiritual consequences of that 'confusion', or flowing together, of the sacred and profane; 'high' and 'low' cultures have now given way to the pervasive popular culture of ordinariness.

Yet this is not an 'ordinary' book. And despite scepticism as to the eternal truths and values beloved of philosophers, it is also a very ideological book. A quick glance at the notes reveals that all the usual pundits are here, from Schopenhauer to Wittgenstein: not notably 'ordinary' guides to anything, least of all happiness. Perhaps because of this, it misses one of the distinguishing features of contemporary religion, among both fundamentalists and Straussian neo-conservatives, which is its anti-intellectualism. Their willingness to adopt traditional beliefs is simply because they are simpler and socially cohesive. Their criticism of popular culture is that it is self-indulgent and egoistical, in which the pursuit of happiness is a euphemism for greed. This was also the conclusion of Sayyid Qutb, founding father of Al Quaida, whose preferred route to happiness is by way of a suicide bomb. But then, who said there's only one way to happiness?

The Way to Happiness is available at £10 postfree from Stephen Mitchell, All Saints Vicarage, The Street, Gazeley, Newmarket, CB8 8RB. Special double deal: *The Way to Happiness* and *Surfing on the Sea of Faith* by Nigel Leaves are available from Stephen Mitchell at £20 postfree.

reviews


The Disciple's Tale

David Boulton reviews

Surfing on the Sea of Faith: the Ethics and Religion of Don Cupitt

by Nigel Leaves

Polebridge Press, 2005. 194 pages. £11. ISBN 0944344631



reviews

'One of the most prolific and original religious experimenters of the postmodern age': that is how Nigel Leaves describes Cupitt in his opening sentence. This is the second of two paperbacks on our hero's life and writings (the first, *Odyssey on the Sea of Faith*, was published last year), and the two books chronicle what Cupitt himself, referring to his whole body of work, once described as 'not a single system but a sort of winding sausage'.

Leaves – Director and Dean of Studies at Wollaston Anglican College, Perth, Australia, and chair of the Perth branch of Sea of Faith – is a faithful Boswell, and his Johnson is duly appreciative. 'How do all these Australians know more about me than I know about myself?' he asked in his Foreword to *Odyssey*. 'Perhaps we should invert the Gospel saying and declare that a prophet is more honoured by those who live furthest away from him.'

Surfing is divided into three parts. The first examines Cupitt on 'Ethics after God', the second 'Cupitt's Religion' and the third 'Cupitt and the Sea of Faith Networks'. The first two parts will be useful reading for those who never got round to progressing beyond the early *Taking Leave of God and The Sea of Faith*, perhaps because two or three books a year seemed to threaten the intellect's digestive system with an overdose of winding sausage.

Cupitt's critics get some space; more often than not they are put to rights by Don's disciple. But Leaves – as does Cupitt himself – evidently accepts the criticism of his 'solar ethics' most cogently put by the Quaker Rachel Muers that 'for the workaday world solar ethics is too bohemian and short-termist', too individualist and anarchic. Leaves argues that Cupitt saw the force of this criticism, which has driven him in the last five years to look for ways of combining solar 'personal' ethics with humanitarian social ethics in a secular postmodernity which he equates with the kingdom theology of Jesus. However, for many of us, equating 'the kingdom' with current secular postmodernity would seem to undercut the radical potential for social and personal transformation which is what Jesus was surely all about.

In the third section Leaves moves from Cupitt's own writings to those of the 'many people in Networks such as Sea of Faith who are similarly engaged in creating a faith for the future'. After a potted history of the origins and development of SoF in the UK, New Zealand and Australia, he turns to the work of the networks' 'most

important' writers: David Hart, Stephen Mitchell, Anthony Freeman, Lloyd Geering, Graham Shaw, Hugh Dawes and John Spong. For the purpose of his discussion he uses a tripartite classification of non-realist categories (which he ascribes to me): it is possible to be (1) both philosophically and theologically non-realist, (2) philosophically realist but theologically non-realist, or (3) rhetorically non-realist but theologically realist.

Leaves puts Hart in the first category. Hart is seen as a prime mover in the UK network's 'push to move beyond Cupitt', whose project he has described as 'too cerebral', lacking in 'actual activity' and communitarian expression, and too Christian-based. Mitchell and, more dubiously, Freeman and Geering are similarly categorised as thorough-going philosophical non-realists.

For Leaves, the Anglican-priest-turned-Quaker Graham Shaw falls into my second category as a philosophical realist, sympathetic to Iris Murdoch's neo-Platonism as against Derrida, Rorty, post-structuralism and Cupittian postmodernism, but non-realist in understanding God as a symbol rather than an objective being'. Finally, among the 'most important' SoF writers Leaves considers Hugh Dawes and John Spong, both 'rhetorically non-realist but theologically realist'.

Although none are included among his pantheon of 'most important' writers, Leaves does not neglect the role of women in SoF's 'far-reaching program of theological exploration'. Alison Webster, Teresa Wallace, Anne Padley, Anne Ashworth, Aileen La Tourette, Valerie Clark, Anthea Boulton, Marian Tomlinson, Anne Horner, Wendy Worham, Penny Mawdsley: their contributions, creative or critical (or both) are recorded, often with perceptive comments.

If *Surfing* were commercially distributed in Britain it would make a most valuable contribution to a wider knowledge of Cupitt and the Sea of Faith Network. Unfortunately, Polebridge Press – which now publishes Cupitt – has no distributor here. But copies imported from California are obtainable from SoF's Stephen Mitchell (address below).

Surfing on the Sea of Faith is available at £11 postfree from Stephen Mitchell, All Saints Vicarage, The Street, Gazeley, Newmarket, CB8 8RB. Special double deal: *Surfing on the Sea of Faith* and *The Way to Happiness* by Don Cupitt are available from Stephen Mitchell at £20 postfree.

Philip Knight reviews

Science, Consciousness and Ultimate Reality

edited by David Lorimer


Imprint Academic (Exeter). 2004. 250 pages. Pbk. ISBN: 090784579 7

William James and Daniel Dennett, for their own very different reasons, have expressed doubts about the existence of consciousness. If you follow that direction, you will not be entirely convinced by the arguments presented by most of the essays in this readable discussion of recent developments in the field of consciousness studies. The book is divided into three sections: (1) physics (2) neuroscience and psychology and (3) theology and ethics.

The first section could just as well have been labelled meta-physics. Each of the three writers in this section expresses a faith in the ability of physics to depict the world 'the way it is' even though this way, in their essays, is not that normally understood by scientific materialism. In the opinion of this reviewer questions like 'What is the world really like?' (p. 90) are not better answered by increasing the resources from which to draw to include consciousness. A more humble science which has shed all pretensions to be theology will still theorise how brain, mind and world relate (in the broadest sense of the term) and will still draw moral and religious lessons from this, but it will not think that in doing so it has uncovered something ultimate about the nature of reality. It is the thought that it can, expressed by many of the contributors, which I found the least appealing part of this book.

That said, the remaining two sections made for an interesting read. Section 2 begins with essays by Peter Fenwick, who is well known for his research into parapsychological phenomena such as mystical, psychical and near-death experiences, and Guy Claxton who is far more sceptical about both the cognitive nature of these phenomena and our ability to be certain that we have a substantial self. A greater clarity of awareness is required, Claxton suggests, before we start to make grand claims on behalf of consciousness studies to have uncovered the nature of mind, humanity, the universe etc. The place to start is down to earth with perceptions that are of human origin, developing thereby what he calls a 'proximal spirituality'. For Fenwick, though, our experience of parapsychological phenomena is evidence, 'that the mind is not limited to the body' (p.111) and calls for a 'science of spirituality' (p. 126) giving priority to experiences which suggest that consciousness transcends the physical brain. I take the debate between the positions of Fenwick and Claxton to stand at the heart of this book. Your attitude to the other essays is likely to be shaped by whether you are more in agreement with Fenwick or Claxton.

Keith Ward's essay kicks off the final section of the book on theology and ethics with an excellent exposition of the Christian idea of the soul (understood as a unity of



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a material body and an immaterial consciousness) and its continuation after death. Combining strands of thought from the Bible and Aristotle, Christian tradition asserts that human consciousness and the purpose of human life cannot be fully understood independent of a belief in the reality of personal creator God.

Mary Midgley, a speaker at this year's SoF conference, uses her essay to plead for an end to the apartheid of mind and body. Instead of dualism we must recognise the complexity of both mind and matter in forming the whole human personality within the context of a life lived in relationships with other people and the living planet.

Alan Torrance offers a clear defence of Christian theism against what he regards as the twin evils of naturalism (represented by Dewey, Davidson, Dawkins, and Dennett) and anti-realist social constructivism (represented, among others, by Rorty and Cupitt). Like Ward, Torrance gains from theism a hope in a life beyond this one and sees this as no more problematic than the problems secularism has to face meeting the challenges imposed on academic values by naturalism and anti-realism.

Denis Alexander's essay summarises a number of recent ways of modelling the relationship between science and religion and in the final essay, John Habgood offers a similar view of personhood to that put forward by Alexander and Midgley. Habgood is concerned with how this theistic view of personhood is being challenged by developments in reproductive medicine and the genetic view of humanity. The other essays in this volume present the case for theistic realism while the book as a whole raises scientific, moral and religious questions about the mystery of consciousness which should not be ignored. These are questions that religious non-realists will need to address if they are to be taken seriously by an audience engrossed by questions raised in consciousness studies.

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Why we need poets

Anne Ashworth reviews

The Logic of Whistling

by Richard Skinner

Cairns Publications. 2002. £8. ISBN: 1870652371

After Babel

by Christine Webb

Peterloo Poets 2004. £7.95. 1904324037

Just as the Greek myths still stand behind much modern literature, so does Christianity. It is always fascinating to see how contemporary poets handle this inheritance. Richard Skinner and Christine Webb offer quite different approaches.

For those who conceive God, if at all, as an absence, R.S. Thomas is a ready choice among modern poets. In *The Logic of Whistling* Skinner offers overt homage to Thomas in a 20-page sequence called *Probes*. For R.S. Thomas there remained 'only the God-space into which I send out my probes.' Skinner admits to having probed this space on several occasions. He uses the metaphor of space-probes:


Transmissions...
dispatched ten years ago, mystically
consist of sporadic static punctuated
by fragments of apparent lucidity.
It is the periods of silence, however,
which make the most sense.

R.S. Thomas would have admired this sequence. Skinner's metaphors are unusual, often challenging: what about God as an obliterating blizzard into which one stumbles like Captain Oates? Some of the poems are humorous and daring:

It was not the Word
we had been expecting.
Love had been the front runner
closely followed by hope,
peace, mercy and grace.
Faith had been popular,
as had justice. Reward
also had its supporters.
Then God created laughter
and all bets were off.

This collection ranges across many topics, one being art. A delightful sequence of tiny poems deals with Michelangelo's image of God's finger almost connecting with Adam's. 'The untouch seethes between them', says one poem.

Less than the width
of a proton or
greater than that
of the universe?
From finger-tip
to finger-tip
the distance between
God
and Adam
is both.



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An exhibition of Russian icons, however, leaves Skinner cold.

These icons are not my icons.
During the time I spend with them
Beech trees are left unhugged
Beethoven's Late Quartets unplayed,
The coastal path unwalked,
My cat unstroked.

I heartily commend this book.

In *After Babel* Christine Webb includes two poems which use biblical mythology, and a sequence of five based on gospel narratives. In two cases she provides a provocatively feminist surprise. Eve in Eden manages to make writing materials, but dominant Adam insists 'Women don't write... and screwed up her bible.' Webb begins the gospel sequence with a meditation on the experience of being brought up with the Bible; only on mature reflection did she notice something missing: 'It was not for a long time that I noticed the absence of women.' One of the poems in this sequence sets the story of the prodigal son on a modern farm with computer technology; only at the end do we discover that the two brothers also have a sister, who at last leaves the farm, disgusted with male condescension and male stupidity. Other poems in which the speaker is a woman feature Elizabeth, mother of John the Baptist, Martha, and Mary Magdalene.

In her title poem, *After Babel*, Webb takes an imaginative approach to the Babel story. She describes how 'the day after work stopped on the building' the old language was lost; no one knew what to call anything. Wise grandmother called them all together, gave them a slip of paper each and sent them off in different directions. Each group invented words for what they encountered. 'At times we met the others, traded words.' Much later, they remembered the slips of paper.

We smoothed them out
and found a single word in our old language.
It was the same on every one (and try
as we might we never recalled another).
'Together', it said. 'Together', 'Together'.

Most of this collection has no religious reference, yet the language crops up, as it will, when the poet is deeply moved in a love poem: 'I began to study the book of your face... Holy Book. Daily bread.'

Perhaps what we look to poets for is this sense of the holy in the here and now. They have always provided it – Wordsworth, Shelley, Eliot and so many more. More than ever, perhaps, we need the service of poets today, poets whose words can provide the depth and significance once found in religion.

Cicely Herbert reviews

Kingdom of Heaven

Film directed by Ridley Scott on general release

The poet Edwin Brock wrote: 'There are many cumbersome ways to kill a man.' If one learned little else from Ridley Scott's *Kingdom of Heaven* one certainly witnessed a great deal of cumbersome killing. Medieval weaponry, mobile siege towers, battering rams, petraries and mangonels to sling giant stones, boiling tar poured from ramparts and then ignited, all was lovingly reconstructed. The wonder was that by the end of the film anyone had survived at all. War tactics of the time, (as indeed, the history of the crusades) seem to have been carefully researched and the battle scenes were an impressive example of the director's art. Even so, my pleasure at the thought of so many extras earning good money was dampened somewhat when I realised that the extraordinarily vast crowds were, in fact, computer generated.

I had entered the cinema with high expectations and emerged, battered, an eternity later after a prolonged attack on the senses. Ridley Scott's version of the third crusade is played as a boisterous fairytale, featuring a collection of well-known actors, among them Liam Neeson and Jeremy Irons, mostly hamming it up for all it was worth. The central role of an improbable, unschooled, young French blacksmith with an instinct for peace and fair play was taken by Orlando Bloom. The intention was fine but the script was often pedestrian (when the blacksmith urges his troops into battle there were leaden echoes of Laurence Olivier's *Henry V* at the battle of Agincourt) and the music was a mishmash of vaguely Arabic sounds and wailing, underlined by a generalised orchestral background sound. In spite of some very handsome landscapes and interiors – the film was made partly in Morocco – the final impression is of noise and confusion.

Nevertheless, a connection is clearly made between the Christian Crusades of the Middle Ages and Bush and Blair's war in Iraq. As a non-adherent to any orthodox religion I find it extraordinary that two professed Christians could so thoughtlessly have instigated a war in which thousands of civilian deaths were inevitable, have suffered so few doubts about their actions and have shown so little remorse for the destruction and violence they unleashed. In search of some understanding of this, I discovered that there are currently at least two excellent works about the Crusades available in book shops: a three volume history of the Crusades¹ by Thomas Asbridge, professor of Early Medieval History at Queen Mary's



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College, University of London and *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*² by Amin Maalouf. In the epilogue to his book Maalouf writes:

In a Muslim world under constant attack, it is impossible to prevent the emergence of a sense of persecution, which among certain fanatics takes the form of a dangerous obsession. The Turk Mehmet Ali Agca, who tried to shoot the Pope on 13 May 1981, had expressed himself in a letter in these terms: 'I have decided to kill John Paul II, supreme commander of the Crusades.' Beyond this individual act, it seems clear that the Arab East still sees the West as a natural enemy. Against that enemy, any hostile action – be it political, military, or based on oil – is considered no more than legitimate vengeance. And there can be no doubt that the schism between the two worlds dates from the Crusades, deeply felt, even today, as an act of rape.

However it should also be remembered that Muslims had occupied the holy city of Jerusalem for many years before the first Christian crusade in the eleventh century and that the threat of aggression from the East was always very real.

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1. Thomas Asbridge, *The First, Second and Third Crusades*. A new History in three volumes. The Free Press History. www.simonsays.co.uk
 2. Amin Maalouf, *The Crusades Through Arab Eyes*, published by Saqi. www.saqibooks.com

Chalcedon 45 I

Sequentes igitur sanctos Patres,
unum **eundem**¹ que confiteri
Filium et Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum
consonanter omnes docemus,
eundem² que perfectum in deitate,
et **eundem**³ perfectum in humanitate,
Deum verum et hominem verum,
eundem⁴ ex anima rationali et corpore,
consubstantialem⁵ Patri
secundum deitatem,
consubstantialem⁶ nobis **eundem**⁷
secundum humanitatem,
per omnia nobis similem absque peccato;
ante saecula quidem de Patre genitum
secundum deitatem,
in novissimis autem diebus **eundem**⁸
propter nos et propter nostram salutem
ex Maria virgine Dei genitrice⁹
secundum humanitatem:
unum **eundem**que¹⁰ Christum Filium
Dominum unigenitum,
in duabus naturis¹¹
inconfuse, immutabiliter, indivise,
inseparabiliter agnoscendum,
nusquam sublata differentia naturarum¹²
propter unionem
magisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae,¹³
et in unam personam¹⁴
et subsistentiam¹⁵ concurrente,
non in duas personas¹⁶ partitum aut divisum,
sed unum **eundem**¹⁷ que Filium
et unigenitum Deum Verbum Dominum
Jesum Christum.

Therefore, following the holy fathers,
we all in agreement teach
that we should confess our Lord Jesus Christ
to be one and **the same** Son,
the same perfect in deity,
and **the same** perfect in humanity,
true God and true man,
the same of a rational soul and body,
consubstantial with the Father
in deity,
the same consubstantial with us
in humanity,
like us in all things except sin;
begotten from the Father before the ages
in deity,
and in latter days, **the same**,
for us and for our salvation,
from the Virgin Mary mother of God
in humanity:
one and **the same** only-begotten
Christ Son Lord,
to be acknowledged in two natures
without confusion, without change,
without division, without separation,
the difference of the natures being in no way removed
because of the union,
but with each nature's property remaining,
and running together into one person
and one subsistence,
not split or divided into two persons,
but one and **the same** Son
and only begotten God Word Lord
Jesus Christ.

1. *ton auton*. These footnotes will give the Greek of key terms in the statement.
2. *ton auton*
3. *ton auton*
4. *ton auton*
5. *homoousion*
6. *homoousion*
7. *ton auton*
8. *ton auton*
9. *theotokou*
10. *ton auton*
11. *phusesin*
12. *phuseon*
13. *phuseos*
14. *prosopon*

15. *hupostasin*
16. *prosopa*
17. *ton auton*
18. *homoousios*. Note 5. Greek words in footnotes to the Latin text are in the case in the original statement. Greek words in footnotes to the English translation are given in the nominative, as usually quoted in English works.
19. *homoousios*. Note 6.
20. *theotokos*. Note 9.
21. *phusis*. Note 11.
22. *phusis*. Note 12.
23. *phusis*. Note 13.
24. *prosopon*. Note 14.
25. *hupostasis*. Note 15.
26. *prosopon*. Note 16.

The Latin text is as given in Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum*, 31st Edition edited by Karl Rahner S.J. (Herder, Barcelona, Freiburg, Rome, 1960). English translation is by the Editor, adapted from that of J.N.D. Kelly.

‘Do you think I am an automaton? – a machine without feelings? and can bear to have my morsel of bread snatched from my lips, and my drop of living water dashed from my cup? Do you think because I am poor, obscure, plain, and little, I am soulless and heartless? You think wrong! I have as much soul as you, – and full as much heart!’

Jane to Mr Rochester
in Charlotte Bronte,
Jane Eyre,
chapter 23



Charlotte Bronte